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Abstract 
Federal agencies in the United States are required to prepare regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) 
for every major regulatory action they undertake. Increasingly, other OECD countries are imposing 
similar requirements. However, there has been little examination of the quality of these documents or of 
the uses to which they have been put in the regulatory process or elsewhere. In this paper we survey 
previous efforts to evaluate RIAs and find a fair amount of evaluation of RIAs as stand-alone documents, 
but much less evaluation of their contribution to producing better regulations. 
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Winston Harrington and Richard D. Morgenstern∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
The criteria for assessing the success or failure of regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) are not 
well established in the literature. One widely accepted basis for evaluation is the academic- 
style quality when the RIAs are treated as stand-alone documents. Another important basis  
for evaluation is the accuracy of the implicit predictions the RIAs make about regulatory 
outcomes. Although both of these considerations are important, the present paper argues that 
RIAs should also be judged in a larger context: whether they advance the objectives of the 
overall regulatory process.  
In making these judgments a number of different issues must be considered. Since it is 
impossible to evaluate an RIA without an understanding of where such analyses fit in the overall 
regulatory process we will start with the origin of RIAs, their purposes, both stated and unstated, 
and the various uses to which they have subsequently been put. We take most of our examples of 
RIAs and discussion of their use from the federal government of the United States, where the 
RIA requirement is oldest and best established. Similarly, most of our examples concern 
environmental policy, but we believe our arguments are applicable to other policy areas.  
2. What is Regulatory Impact Analysis? 
A perhaps apocryphal story has it that the state legislature in Georgia, in order to simplify 
calculations made by engineers, architects, and others, once decreed that the value of π was 
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henceforth to be 3. Usually, however, public policy is not made with this degree of whimsy, 
especially in democratic governments. Usually policymakers want some assurance that the cure 
will not be worse than the disease. It is this desire that creates a demand for impact analysis of 
governmental actions.  
More specifically, regulatory impact analysis has come to mean the use of economic 
analysis—in particular benefit–cost analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis—to examine the 
implications of government regulations. Although the typical RIA examines a proposed health, 
safety, or environmental regulation directed against the behavior of private firms, RIAs have also 
been used for other kinds of regulations (e.g., bankruptcy) and against other types of actors, such 
as subordinate governmental units or public enterprises (e.g., publicly owned wastewater 
treatment plants).  
The RIA was first used as a formal government requirement in the United States. In 1981, 
one of the earliest acts of the Reagan administration was to require each “major” proposed 
federal regulation to be accompanied by an assessment of benefits and costs and an examination 
of alternatives to the proposed regulation. Such regulations were also subject to review by the 
influential Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Centralized review imposed common 
practices and quality standards across all executive agencies. It contested congressional influence 
over regulatory decisionmaking, which was growing throughout the 1970s as a result of the mass 
of social legislation enacted at this time.1 The establishment of the RIA requirement in the 
United States is described in more detail in the Appendix.  
3. How RIAs and Regulatory Review Have Changed Rulemaking 
Now that some time has passed since RIAs and regulatory review have become important 
elements of decisionmaking by governments, it is natural that assessments of these tools should 
                                                 
1 Morris Fiorina (1977) was evidently the first to argue that Congress, interest groups, and Executive Branch 
agencies were locked in a triangle of self-interest, with interest groups seeking economic rents, members  
of Congress seeking re-election, and executive agencies seeking bigger budgets, which led to high levels of 
regulatory activity.  
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begin to appear. Most of these assessments are based on case studies of the regulatory process. 
These include Morgenstern (1997), which contains 12 case studies of regulatory processes at the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Delphi Group (2000), a survey of six case 
studies of various types of regulation in Canada.2  
The case study results and the casual observations suggest that well-done RIAs bring new 
discipline and rigor to the rulemaking process. They force decisionmakers and analysts to think 
critically about the implications, both positive and negative, of the regulations they propose. 
While regulatory review doesn’t add to the legal hurdles associated with rulemaking, it does 
place on regulators some (limited) responsibility of explaining why a regulation with negative 
net benefits should be put into place. For these reasons, successful RIAs are thought to improve 
the decisions made by government agencies.  
Beyond this stated purpose, RIAs can serve several other functions in the rulemaking 
process. First, the need to prepare an RIA provides regulators with a framework for thinking 
through the consequences of regulations, determining what they do and do not know about those 
consequences, and subsequently eliciting information from the regulated community and the 
general public. Second, the RIA requirement often encourages capacity building in regulatory 
agencies, which must have expertise in economics, policy analysis, and statistics in order to 
prepare RIAs or to supervise their preparation by consultants. Third, the completed RIA, in turn, 
informs and potentially instructs the interested community—the advocates on either side of the 
issue. As a result of providing this information, RIAs can help set the terms of the debate over 
the proposed regulation. Of the many disputes that attend the typical regulatory process, the RIA 
can help determine which are factual and therefore can potentially be resolved by more data and 
which are philosophical and much less amenable to scientific or technical analysis. Finally, it can 
induce an improved understanding of the implications of federal regulatory activity by officials 
in all branches of government. As one close observer in the United States has argued, these 
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energy-efficiency regulations, and gasoline sulfur content regulations. 
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officials “would know less about regulation than they know now were it not for the development 
of … a tradition of scrutinizing regulatory proposals” (Portney 1984). 
Other studies—statistical studies of large numbers of rules—are less sanguine about the 
quality of RIAs or the performance of the regulatory review process. Necessarily, such analyses 
can only focus on a small number of outcomes and cannot approach the level of detail in a case 
study. For example, Robert Hahn (Hahn 1996, Hahn et al. 2000, 2001) has conducted several 
surveys of RIAs in the United States, focusing primarily on whether these documents contain all 
the elements that are essential to a proper analysis. As we discuss further in the next section, his 
surveys find that many RIAs perform poorly in this respect. Scott Farrow (2000) asks a more 
utilitarian question, namely, whether the regulatory review process, of which the RIA is an 
important component, has led to the promulgation of more cost-effective rules, also in the U.S. 
context. He also found that rules never issued (for whatever reason) were not much less cost-
effective than rules that were issued and that the RIA could not be credited with any 
improvements in cost-effectiveness between the proposed and final rule. This work will also be 
considered further in a later section.  
The effect of RIAs on the overall economic efficiency of regulations is limited in other ways 
that will not be possible to overcome. First, statutes enabling regulation can expressly forbid the 
development of regulations on the basis of net benefits, even forbidding in some cases the 
consideration of costs in setting standards. The U.S. Clean Air Act is a notable example, 
disallowing cost considerations in the setting of ambient standards, although it does allow costs 
to be considered when writing source-specific regulations. (Despite this prohibition, RIAs are 
prepared for ambient air quality standards, such as the recent revision to the primary national 
ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter.) Second, in the United States at 
least, the RIA requirement applies only to actions by executive branch agencies. There is nothing 
in the legislative process that corresponds to the comprehensive evaluation found in a good 
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RIA.3 For statutes that provide the authority to write regulations, this means that many important 
features of regulations could be determined before the regulatory review process begins.4  
4. Evaluation Methods for RIAs 
There are at least three ways to evaluate the performance of RIAs: content tests, outcome 
tests, and function tests. Each contributes something valuable, and each complements the other 
two. In this section we examine them in turn. 
4.1 Content tests  
Content tests are ex ante tests of the material contained in the RIA—i.e., they are assessments 
that only examine material that was available to the RIA authors at the time the RIA was 
prepared, even if the assessment itself was prepared long afterwards. Typically, such assessments 
ask whether the RIA meets the applicable guidelines for preparation of RIAs. For example, 
current OMB guidelines in the United States require each RIA to do four things: state the need 
for the proposed regulation, discuss alternatives, assess benefits and costs of each, and explain 
why the proposed regulation is preferable to the alternatives. (U.S. OMB 2003, Appendix D). 
Beyond these requirements, content tests examine whether the RIA contains the elements 
required of a good economic analysis of the issue and whether those elements themselves meet 
                                                 
3 For important legislation there are often competing bills, each accompanied by reams of analysis and 
argumentation prepared by supporters and opponents outside of Congress. However, there is no steady source of 
unbiased information, although academic groups without an axe to grind often weigh in with analyses. One source 
has suggested that perhaps the closest congressional analogue to the RIA is the committee reports that must 
accompany each bill reported to the floor of the House and Senate (Personal Communication, J. Clarence Davies, 
August 2003). Certainly proposed legislation is often subject to close analysis, especially if it is of major import,  
but there are no requirements to conduct analysis in a certain way or include a comprehensive analysis of benefits 
and costs. 
4 A U.S. example is the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) mandating minimum fuel economy 
standards in light-duty vehicles, required by the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act. This act explicitly set 
fuel economy standards for cars and directed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to set 
them for light trucks. A firm’s performance is measured separately for cars and trucks and for each it is the sales-
weighted average of the fuel economy of the vehicles (cars or trucks) produced by the company. The averaging 
provision permits a degree of intrafirm “trading” of vehicle fuel economy, but the trading is limited because neither 
the averaging of cars and truck performance nor the averaging of all manufacturers’ performance is permitted.  
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acceptable standards of quality. Essentially, these approaches judge RIAs by the standards of 
applied microeconomics, asking only whether they pass muster as benefit–cost analyses. 
All draft and final RIAs are scrutinized for quality by OMB and are subject to remand  
to the agency for redrafting if they are inadequate. This is one of the methods OMB uses to 
assure quality and accountability. Observers outside the government have also examined the 
content of RIAs.  
4.1.1 Extensive tests 
The most extensive examination of RIA content can be found in ongoing work by Robert 
Hahn and colleagues. Hahn et al. (2000) examined 48 RIAs in federal agencies in the United 
States prepared between 1996 and 1999, with particular attention to two aspects: whether they 
met the legal requirements of the executive order and whether they satisfied the guidelines 
produced by the OMB. Hahn et al. refer to their method as “scoring”; it essentially is a checklist 
to determine whether certain items are included.5  
The authors conclude that many RIAs fail to include items that they regard as essential for a 
quality product and frequently do not contain the elements required by the executive order. 
While 90 percent monetized costs, 50 percent monetized benefits, and only 29 percent calculated 
net benefits. Only two-thirds of the RIAs discussed alternatives to the regulation, and only 25 
percent calculated benefits and costs of alternatives. A follow-up on this study (Hahn and Dudley 
2002), which also included a sample of earlier RIAs, attempted to discern whether there were 
differences in the quality of RIAs over time, particularly among RIAs completed during various 
presidential administrations. (They concluded that there were few differences.) 
Hahn et al. also subjected the content to two other tests: whether it was “transparent”—so 
that the reader could easily find what was being assumed in the analysis and could follow all the 
calculations—and whether it was internally consistent, so that the same assumptions were used 
                                                 
5 Delphi Group (2000) contains a much more extensive checklist for RIAs. 
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throughout. In these areas, Hahn et al. (2000) also found that recent RIAs left much to be 
desired. The authors’ operational tests for these criteria were the presence of an executive 
summary (only half of RIAs had one) and the treatment of the discount rate (86 percent used the 
OMB-specified rate throughout). 
Hahn et al. are quick to point out that the inclusion of these items is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for a good RIA. If these items are not present, they argue, the RIA can hardly 
be considered of good quality, for they pertain to matters that are essential for being able to 
assess regulatory impact. However, an RIA that satisfies the checklist may still be deficient. The 
fact that so many RIAs omit essential information led Hahn et al. to conclude that RIAs as a 
group have serious quality problems. 
However, Hahn et al. treat all RIAs the same in the analysis. The results might have been 
different if the RIAs had been weighted by a measure of the economic importance—such as the 
expected costs or benefits—of the rule. The EPA generally budgets resources for preparation of 
RIAs in part on the significance of the regulation that depends, in turn, on the anticipated 
benefits or costs. Arguably, larger budgets should mean higher quality, a supposition generally 
supported by the RIAs examined in Morgenstern (1997), which we discuss further below.  
Hahn and his colleagues may be correct that the typical RIA is deficient in a number of areas,  
but it could also be that the RIAs representing the lion’s share of benefits and costs are far  
from typical.  
4.1.2 Intensive tests 
In addition to these tests, there are also intensive tests of RIA content, concerned with the 
quality of the components, rather than simply their existence. At the most basic level, this sort of 
analysis examines whether the RIA avoids egregious errors, such as double counting of benefits 
or costs, confusion of costs and expenditures, improper definitions of benefits, failure to 
distinguish between cost or benefits and transfer payments, improper discounting, and the like. It 
also examines the transparency and clarity of the RIA. Do the authors explain how they arrived 
at their conclusions? Can quantitative outcomes be linked to inputs? Are the authors clear what 
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assumptions they are making? Are those assumptions reasonable? Do the authors define an 
appropriate counterfactual or baseline?  
Certainly, it is not difficult to find extensive critiques of individual RIAs. By far, the majority 
are submitted during the comment period on proposed regulations by advocacy organizations or 
research organizations identified with a point of view (e.g., the Center for Progressive Regulation 
or the Mercatus Center at George Mason University), with the objective of influencing the final 
regulation. Far less common are RIA evaluations conducted by individuals or organizations 
whose positions on regulatory matters are not entirely predictable. However, the EPA will 
sometimes submit internal or contractor-prepared economic analyses in support of a regulation to 
external peer review.  
It is possible to visualize a more systematic approach to real-time evaluation of RIAs by 
consulting a wide variety of opinion and experience outside the agency. For example, 
Morgenstern and Landy (1997) describe a “scoping process,” in which the agency begins to 
solicit input from interested parties to identify important issues and approaches as soon as the 
economic analysis is initiated. Including disinterested experts among those solicited could 
provide what amounts to a rolling peer review as the RIA is developed. As Morgenstern and 
Landy put it, “The earlier the analytic template is laid out, the greater its claim to serve as the 
relative impartial basis for subsequent policy discussion and debate. If it appears only after 
different parties have advanced their own analyses, it is less likely to guide the debate” (p. 475). 
4.2 Outcome tests 
Another way of assessing RIAs is to examine the outcomes of regulations ex post and 
compare actual results to their predicted counterparts in the RIA. If RIAs cannot accurately 
predict what will happen if the regulation is adopted, they will eventually lose credibility and 
hence their value in the decisionmaking process. In fact, assessment of RIA performance is only 
one of two good reasons for conducting ex post analysis; an even more important reason is to 
assess the performance of the regulation itself.  
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By some reckonings, ex post analysis is very common in both the European Union (EU) and 
the United States. There is no shortage of ex post evaluation of regulatory programs in almost 
every area of public policy. To speak only of environmental policy, we have numerous 
colleagues at academic centers in the EU who have devoted resources to the examination of 
regulatory implementation. For example, the Center for Clean Technology and Environmental 
Policy (CSTM) at the University of Twente in the Netherlands has conducted ex post 
examination of all Dutch environmental regulation (e.g., Bressers 1991). Researchers at the 
University of Gothenburg, Sweden, have also analyzed the outcomes of numerous policies in 
both the European context and also for particular countries (e.g., Hammar and Löfgren 2001). 
We are also aware that considerable ex post analysis takes place in France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. 
In the United States, examination of implementation issues has also captured the attention of 
numerous academics. Ex post analysis has also been institutionalized in the federal government 
and in federal legislation. For example, the EPA is required to issue a report every five years on 
the benefits and costs of regulations promulgated by the agency. The U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) issues periodic reports from USGS stream monitoring networks showing the rate of 
progress in improving water quality. The EPA also publishes periodic reports on levels of 
ambient air quality and estimated pollutant emissions into air and water. Ex post analysis of 
social policy is also quite far advanced. For example, organizations such as the Manpower 
Development Commission conduct sophisticated experiments on the behavioral effect of cash 
incentives or work requirements for welfare recipients. 
All these studies, however, are incomplete in crucial ways. They focus on the effectiveness 
of the regulation, which for environmental regulations means the measurement of pollution 
reduction, reduction in measured risk, and in some cases on improvements in environmental 
quality. It is much less common to find ex post studies examining other aspects of regulation, in 
particular studies that also examine the actual costs incurred and compare them to the estimated 
costs. To be sure, ex post estimates of regulatory costs can be found, but they are difficult to tie 
to particular regulations (as is often the case with regulatory benefits, for that matter). For 
example, from 1982 until 1994 and again beginning in 2000 the U.S. Census Bureau 
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administered the Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure Survey (PACE) to a random 
sample of establishments, inquiring about expenditures on air and water pollution abatement and 
solid waste reduction. Unfortunately, the survey instrument makes it impossible to associate 
expenditures with particular regulations.  
Several years ago the authors of this report were working together on a project to study the 
ability of regulators to estimate the cost of regulation by comparing the cost estimates produced 
during the rulemaking process with the actual costs of the regulation (Harrington et al. 2000). 
We were surprised that despite extensive efforts in which we contacted a wide range of experts 
around the world, in the end we could find only a handful of ex ante, ex post pairs of studies that 
considered both effectiveness and cost of regulations.  
At first blush, it seems odd that ex post studies of regulatory effectiveness are common, 
while cost studies are not. In principle, both the benefits (or effects) and the costs of regulation 
are unobservable, because although the world with the regulation is observed, the counterfactual 
is not and must be modeled. If this were the only factor at work, it would suggest that ex post 
studies of effectiveness and cost ought to be rare or common, but not that studies of one should 
be rare and of the other common. Perhaps part of the explanation is that government authorities, 
who produce most of the estimates of regulatory performance, have more incentive to estimate 
the effects of regulation than the costs.  
It is also quite likely that ex post estimation of costs is considerably more difficult than ex 
post estimation of pollution abatement, environmental improvement, or other measures of 
regulatory performance (and, of course, more difficult than ex ante cost estimation used in 
RIAs). Instead of the “model plant” or hypothetical cost estimates generally used in ex ante 
studies, an ex post cost study requires the actual expenditures of the plants subject to the 
regulation.6 This information is often proprietary and not available to the analyst and, even when 
                                                 
6 It also requires the analyst to be able to distinguish between an expenditure and a cost. Sometimes a cost is not an 
expenditure, such as when regulated firms use land or other resources already in their possession to comply with the 
regulation. And sometimes an expenditure is not a cost, for example, transfer payments. 
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available, it is often difficult to interpret. Abatement costs are notoriously subject to joint cost 
allocation problems, because plant activities to comply with one regulation can increase (or 
decrease) plant output or make it more (or less) difficult to comply with other regulations. For 
example, analysts are still arguing about the costs incurred by the automobile industry in 
complying with the 1970 Clean Air Act. To what extent can the cost of electronic fuel injection, 
which was disseminated from a small group of high-performance vehicles to the entire industry 
during the 1980s, be attributed to the exigencies of the pollution abatement regulations? If there 
had been no such regulations, would the corporate fuel economy (CAFE) regulation, which was 
also enacted about this time, have diffused this technology through the industry as rapidly? In the 
absence of both regulations, would competitive pressures have done the job? 
Some regulations also have costs that are difficult to estimate because they are not readily 
observable in market transactions. For example, OSHA’s cotton dust regulation in the 1970s 
considered, as an alternative to stringent limits on cotton fibers within textile plants, less 
stringent limits accompanied by mandatory use of respirators by some plant workers. The cost of 
this alternative would have to include a measure of workers’ discomfort and inconvenience 
associated with respirator use, unless it was fully compensated by wage increases (in which case 
the wage increases would measure the cost), as well as increased risk resulting from worker 
noncompliance. Similar considerations have arisen with asbestos and pesticide regulations. 
Examination of this relatively meager collection of cases produced some surprising 
conclusions about the RIA. We were expecting to support one of the two stories frequently told 
about cost estimates in ex ante studies. On the one hand, political conservatives and other foes of 
social regulation argue that RIAs routinely underestimate the cost of regulatory statutes and, to a 
lesser extent, individual regulations. On the other hand, advocates counter that costs of individual 
regulations are nearly always overestimated. While we found the latter to be true insofar as it 
concerned the total costs, we also found that the effects of the regulation—the emission or risk 
reductions—were overestimated as well. To the extent that unit costs could be calculated, we 
found that overall there was no bias toward overestimation or underestimation. The main reason 
the costs and benefits were overestimated was a failure to implement the regulation fully. We 
also found that there was one category of regulations where unit costs were almost always 
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overestimated in the RIA—economic incentive (EI) policies. In these cases, unit costs were 
overestimated because the environmental improvement was underestimated. This was something 
of a surprise, inasmuch as the main criticism of EI from the early ’70s (mainly of price 
instruments such as effluent fees) was that they could not be relied upon to achieve the desired 
environmental results. 
Another conclusion of our research was that there were systematic differences between 
government agencies in the accuracy of the cost estimates. For regulations promulgated by the 
EPA, we found no bias in regulatory estimates. For regulations issued by the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, however, we found that RIAs usually overestimated costs 
substantially. The result for OSHA has been supported by a survey of recent RIAs (Seong and 
Mendeloff 2003), which shows that the estimated benefits of recent workplace safety regulations 
are seriously overestimated, possibly because of incomplete implementation. Seong and 
Mendeloff also observe that OSHA RIAs are required to assume complete implementation, 
perhaps in part accounting for the overestimates. 
Comparisons of ex post outcomes to ex ante predictions offer an essential element of 
“ground-truthing” to the practice of regulatory evaluation. The comparison of regulatory 
outcomes to the predictions made in the RIA is a valuable test of both the RIA and the regulation 
itself. A well-done ex post analysis, moreover, is not limited simply to an examination of the 
effectiveness and cost of the regulations, but can test other assertions made during the regulatory 
process. Investigation along these dimensions can inform future regulations and RIAs. The 
nature of these additional claims depends on the situation. Some examples:  
Did the regulation lead to job losses or plant closures? In Sweden, a ban on the use of 
chlorinated solvents prompted the industry to threaten plant closures and relocation to other more 
hospitable countries (presumably located in the third world). An ex post study by Thomas 
Sterner (2003) has shown that virtually no plants shut down. On the other hand, the ban was not 
entirely successful as a number of plants, producing a third of all output, were granted 
exemptions to continue production (Sterner 2003). 
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Is it difficult to implement? Consider the U.S. Effluent Guidelines, which were very detailed 
process- and industry-specific regulations for point-source industrial wastewater dischargers. 
During the first round of standard setting (about 1974–1981) nearly all of the promulgated 
regulations were challenged in court, resulting in substantial delay and in many cases remand of 
the regulations to the EPA (Harrington 2003). Of course, not much of the litigation was 
attributable to the regulatory documentation (most of which was prepared before the Reagan 
executive order in any case). Rather, it is best seen as a test of EPA’s political will and power to 
implement its regulations. 
Has new technology been developed to comply with the regulation? The classic case of new 
technology in the United States is the vinyl chloride case, where evidence of a strong link 
between exposure and liver cancer caused OSHA to promulgate, despite industry’s claims of 
technical infeasibility, very stringent worker exposure regulations. Within a year of the issuance 
of the final rule, a substitute had been developed at a tiny fraction of the predicted cost of the 
regulation. On the other hand, exposure to coke-oven emissions was regulated in a similar 
fashion, but in this case the needed innovations did not emerge, and the industry had to be 
granted regulatory relief. These cases and others are discussed in a retrospective examination  
of OSHA regulation conducted in 1995 by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (U.S. 
OTA 1995).  
Like the content tests, ex post analysis of regulatory outcomes can be very informative, but 
doesn’t tell us everything we’d like to know. In particular it doesn’t give any information on the 
effect of the RIA on the outcome of the regulatory process itself.  
4.3 Function Tests 
The idea of evaluating RIAs presupposes that RIAs make a difference—namely, that the 
outcome of regulatory processes is in some way different from what it would have been in the 
absence of the RIA. The counterfactual is difficult to conceptualize because, even without the 
current RIA requirement, it is nonetheless likely that some analysis of the effects of regulation 
would have been done. In any case, there has been remarkably little analysis of the effect of RIA 
characteristics on regulatory outcomes.  
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To a certain extent, the content tests discussed earlier can tell us something about the uses of 
the RIA in decisionmaking. A particularly important instance is the RIA’s treatment of 
alternatives. As noted by Hahn, examination of alternatives to the chosen regulation is more the 
exception than the rule in recent RIAs. Absence of alternatives suggests, more than anything 
else, that the RIA did not, nor was expected to, play a significant role in the design of the 
proposed regulation. However, the presence of alternatives does not indicate whether these 
alternatives are merely straw men in the regulatory process. Also, even without considering 
alternatives, the regulation may have served other purposes, such as analyzing whether to go 
forward with the regulation at all.  
One relevant though somewhat dated study of the impact of regulatory documents is Magat 
et al. (1986), which examined the effect of the quality of regulatory support documents generally 
on the outcomes of the Effluent Guidelines regulatory process during the 1970s. Two documents 
were examined: the “development document” and the “economic analysis.” The former gave the 
technical information on the industry, its technological options for wastewater treatment and the 
one identified as the basis of the regulation, while the latter assessed the effect of the proposed 
regulation on costs, prices, profits, plant closures, and unemployment. The authors used a fairly 
elementary definition of document quality—namely, were the numbers consistent? Did the report 
leave a trail that a careful reader could follow to connect the input data with the outputs, i.e., the 
estimated effects?  
What they found was that document quality, defined in this simple way, made a substantial 
difference in how much the agency changed the regulation during the rulemaking process. The 
more coherent the document, the more the effluent standards changed. For example, when the 
development document failed their quality test, the promulgated best practicable technology 
(BPT) standards were made 33% less stringent for biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and 44% 
less stringent for total suspended solids (TSS) than the proposed standards. We don’t mean to 
imply that a more stringent regulation is “better,” only that document quality can affect the 
regulatory outcome. It is possible that poor documentation simply indicated an industry that was 
both difficult to regulate and difficult to characterize in a technical report. Though possibly 
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affected by spurious correlation, we know of no other study that provides statistical evidence that 
the quality of regulatory support documents makes a difference to the outcome of the regulation. 
There is, however, one recent econometric study that examines the effect of regulatory 
review more generally on the rulemaking process. Farrow (2000) uses multivariate regression 
methods to examine a database of 69 regulations proposed by several U.S. agencies and 
reviewed by the OMB, of which seven were rejected (i.e., sent back to the agency for further 
consideration). Eventually all seven were dropped. This database, first developed by John 
Morrall of OMB (Morrall 1986) and updated and refined by Farrow and other researchers, 
consists of health and safety regulations for which researchers were able to calculate the implicit 
value of saving a life. Cost per life saved became the cost-effectiveness standard by which these 
regulations were judged. 
The purpose of Farrow’s study is to examine several potential effects of regulatory review, 
including whether rules with poor cost-effectiveness are more likely to be rejected and whether 
the cost-effectiveness of rules improved during the regulatory review process. The results 
suggested that the regulatory review process had at best a slight effect on cost-effectiveness. 
Rejected rules were only slightly less cost-effective than rules that were adopted, and the cost 
effectiveness of rules did not improve during the process. However, the small sample size 
suggests caution in interpreting the results. With only seven failures, their characteristics could 
easily be unduly influenced by one observation. In addition, many of the rules in the database 
date from the early 1980s, when the regulatory review process at OMB was very new and 
possibly much different from what it is today. A third qualification to this study is that it cannot 
take account of the potential effects of the existence of the review process on the proposed rule 
and the preparation of the RIA. If regulators within an agency know its proposed rules will later 
be scrutinized and possibly returned to them if they are deemed not cost-effective, that 
knowledge is likely to affect their behavior. Thus, although this study is creative and its 
methodology is interesting and potentially useful, with the data that are currently available, it is 
not conclusive. 
In addition, there is a body of case-study evidence that we can draw upon to examine the 
effects of regulation. Among studies we are aware of, the most relevant is a set of studies of 
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RIAs conducted by current or former EPA economists (Morgenstern 1997). The case studies in 
this volume are unusually complete analyses of government regulations, examining not only the 
preparation of the RIA and, to a limited extent, the comparison of ex post results with ex ante 
expectations, but also how the RIA is used in the rulemaking process.  
In looking at these cases, two qualifications should be kept in mind. First, this is a highly 
nonrandom sample. The regulations examined tend to be highly visible cases—large in both 
expected costs and benefits (e.g., lead in gasoline) or having direct effects on household behavior 
(such as the Enhanced Inspection and Maintenance rule for light-duty vehicles). For those 
reasons, these RIAs tended to have large budgets and, with one or two exceptions, were, like the 
retrospective studies of them, reasonably complete and carefully done. Second, the authors of 
these case studies were in most cases closely connected to the regulatory process they were 
writing about, either as EPA officials or as consultants or other close observers outside the 
agency. The advantage provided by this set of authors is their intimate familiarity with the 
regulatory histories. At the same time, the authors’ close involvement in the rulemaking 
processes might lead one to question their detachment. Attempts were made to answer this 
criticism by subjecting each case study to peer review by outsiders almost as knowledgeable and 
without a connection to the issue.  
One of the clearest lessons of these case studies is the critical importance of timing to the 
usefulness of RIAs. Several case-study authors mentioned the fact that many RIAs are not 
initiated until after the regulatory process is well under way, often after the preferred alternative 
has been selected (Morgenstern and Landy 1997). In this situation, the usefulness of the RIA is 
obviously undermined. Worse, it puts pressure on the analyst not to deliver bad news about 
benefits and costs, especially about the preferred alternative, leading to cynicism about the role 
of RIAs in the regulatory process. Most analysts believe the RIA should begin before the 
regulatory process begins, in order to develop information useful in decisionmaking.  
Even in cases where the RIA got off to a late start, however, the authors of all 12 of these 
case studies believe their RIA did have an effect, although often it was not as influential as it 
could have been. According to the authors, all the RIAs led to improvements that decreased 
costs, and five of the 12 introduced changes that increased benefits (Morgenstern and Landy 
16 Resources for the Future  Harrington and Morgenstern 
1997, Table 1), although the authors conceded that, with multiple influences on the process, it is 
difficult to ascribe with certainty any specific influences to the RIA.  
In addition, the authors credited the RIAs with other accomplishments. In the organic 
chemicals effluent guidelines, the RIA identified cross-media pollution (e.g., volatilizing organic 
chemicals into the air rather than discharging them into the water) as an important issue; it had 
been overlooked in other analyses up to that point (Caulkins and Sessions 1997). Other studies 
identified and quantified new benefits. The RIA for the leaded gasoline rule found, for example, 
that the monetized benefits of reduced blood pressure dwarfed other benefits of reduced lead 
exposure and led to a tightening of the rule (Nichols 1997). The innovative market studies done 
in the asbestos study found that for many products the cost of a ban would be modest because of 
the ready availability of substitutes (Augustyniak 1997). 
Some RIAs also promoted innovative regulatory alternatives, at least for their time. The 
leaded gasoline rule examined the use of refinery averaging and banking, both of which became 
cornerstones of the policy governing the lead phasedown between 1984 and 1988. The RIA on 
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) regulations also examined a banking and trading alternative that was 
adopted in the final regulation (1991). Trading was also examined in the RIA for asbestos, but 
was ultimately discarded because of agency inexperience and serious practical difficulties (e.g., 
asbestos embedded in imported products). 
It goes without saying that quantifying the benefits of RIAs would be very difficult, not least 
because it is not even clear what the effect of the RIA is. The RIA can also impose costs, some of 
which we can all agree with in principle, although we may disagree strongly in practice (such as 
the effect of the RIA on the time required to push a regulation through the process).  
5. Some Suggestions for Future Inquiry 
Regulatory processes need timely, high-quality economic and technical analysis that is also 
capable of speaking to both general and technical policy audiences to assist in decisionmaking 
and to assure the integrity of the regulatory process. But how do we know when RIAs actually 
achieve these goals? We have discussed three different vantage points from which RIAs can be 
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evaluated: their content, their outputs, and their function. However, we do not think it is possible 
to “choose” one way to evaluate RIAs. These approaches are not substitutes, but complements.  
A medical analogy might be helpful. We can think of intensive content tests of RIAs as a 
routine checkup. It can take place before the regulatory process is complete and the regulation is 
implemented and therefore can be used to make improvements to the RIA and to the regulation 
in question. The approach could perhaps be enhanced by Morgenstern and Landy’s suggestion to 
bring in outside review both by the public and by experts at the earliest stages of the rulemaking 
process, continuing through until the rule is promulgated.  
It is a little more difficult to put the extensive content tests such as those by Hahn et al. in this 
framework. However, a slight change in research design might make the medical analogy work 
better and make the research more relevant to the present purposes as well. A simple 
modification to Hahn’s methodology would be to link his descriptive data—the content of 
individual RIAs—to outcomes, both of the regulatory process and the results on the ground. 
With this change, the closest medical analogue would be that of retrospective epidemiology—
that is, having observed a diversity of outcomes among a set of individuals, can we link those 
outcomes to characteristics of those individuals or to events that happened at an earlier time?  
In contrast, the case studies examined in Morgenstern (1997) and Delphi Group (2000) are 
autopsies, in that no improvements to the RIA under examination would be of use to that RIA or 
rulemaking process. By examining the successes and failures of the past, their principal use is to 
help find problems in the regulatory process, improve future RIAs, and, most importantly, 
improve future regulations.  
To that end, we think the most important and most difficult item on the agenda is to develop 
a procedure for the routine completion of ex post analyses of regulatory outcomes. As noted 
above, comprehensive ex post analyses that examine physical outcomes and costs are very rare, 
and yet one of the research needs most often cited in policy-analytic circles is the need for more 
ex post analysis. If a type of research is both rare and highly desired, then most likely it is quite 
difficult to do. So, the concluding question before us is, what are the barriers to complete ex post 
analysis, and what can be done about them?  
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One barrier is institutional: the need to find a home for audits of regulatory performance, 
cost, and other implications of regulation. “Line” agencies—the agencies that prepare the rules in 
the first place—appear to be reluctant to undertake such studies, at least in the United States. 
They rarely have the budget to do it, and many in the agency would consider it outside the scope 
of their mission. Most regulators faced with a choice between funding a study of the performance 
of an existing regulation and a study of potential need for a new regulation would have an easy 
choice. Also, some may question whether the promulgating agency would have conflicts that 
would get in the way of a balanced assessment.  
Another barrier is data. Those who have tried to do ex post studies of regulatory outcomes 
quickly run into numerous data problems. Some of these, relating to the definition of costs and 
the difficulties of allocating joint costs, were touched on previously. In addition, there are often 
problems just finding out what the outcomes were. This may be a particular problem in a federal 
system such as that of the United States, where data on regulatory outcomes often exist, but are 
stored by state rather than federal agencies and therefore difficult to assemble. Even when 
centralized data sets exist, often they are poorly audited or collected in a way that does not easily 
permit scientific analysis. For example, the EPA and especially state governments in the United 
States have at times in the past set protocols for collecting ambient environmental data or 
pollutant discharge data for enforcement purposes in order to build cases against offenders, a use 
that is often incompatible with scientific analysis. Furthermore, regulatory analysis is “with and 
without” analysis, not “before and after” analysis, requiring not only what the world was like 
before the regulation was imposed, but what would have happened it its absence. This “baseline” 
problem is more than a data problem; it is also a modeling problem. The world will either be 
observed with the regulation or without it; one cannot rewind the tape of life and play it again.  
To a considerable degree, these well-known problems of policy analysis can be reduced by 
the RIA itself. In particular, a well-done RIA will have data on the preregulatory environment 
and models establishing the baseline. Beyond that, the analysts preparing the RIA are in the best 
position of anyone to determine the time that must elapse before a useful ex post analysis can be 
performed, as well as the data and models that may be needed to complete it.  
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Perhaps, then, it would be a useful addition to the regulatory process to consider the design of 
a potential ex post analysis: when it should be done, how it could be done, and what it would 
cost. Sometimes the data required may already be collected by one or more agencies; other times 
new data collection efforts will be needed. With this information in hand, policymakers can 
decide at the time the regulation is issued whether to invest in that data and model development 
that would permit an ex post analysis. For a relatively modest investment in data development, 
the cost of a subsequent ex post analysis could be substantially reduced and its quality greatly 
improved. In short, the best time to begin an ex post evaluation of a regulation is before the 
regulation becomes effective. 
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Appendix 
Regulatory Impact Analysis in the United States 
Since its inception in the 1970s, RIA has grown enormously in scope and sophistication, and 
no institution has contributed more to this trend than the executive branch of the U.S. 
government. The growth of RIA paralleled the substantial growth of “social” regulation that 
began in the United States in the 1970s.7 Social regulation was concerned with workplace safety 
and health, environmental quality, exposure to hazardous chemicals, unsafe consumer products, 
and like concerns. Ironically, as social regulation waxed, economic regulation waned, with 
deregulation of airlines, trucking, railroads, banking, and—currently in progress—electricity. 
Greater scrutiny of regulations would probably had occurred in any case, but its development 
was greatly enhanced by the long period of “split government” in the United States, in which 
Congress is in the hands of one party and the presidency belongs to the other. Between 1969 and 
2001, power was split except for four years of the Carter administration (1977–1981) and the 
first two years of the Clinton administration (1991–1993).  
Split government meant a wider-than-normal separation between the executive and 
legislative branches of the federal government at a time when Congress was beginning to take a 
more activist approach to environmental, health, and safety regulation. The Democratic Congress 
would propose sweeping legislation directing executive agencies such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) or Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to 
implement detailed regulations, in some cases by industrial sector and in others by product. 
These agencies, in effect, had to serve two masters: the Congress and the President, and were 
                                                 
7 Earlier, federal regulation tended to be economic, concerned with such matters as regulating the prices of goods or 
services produced by industries thought to be natural monopolies and whose activities crossed state lines. These 
included railroads, airlines, and transmission of natural gas and electricity. Federal regulation also restricted 
activities of banks and sought to prevent excessive concentrations of market power. See Portney (1990, chapter 1) 
for a discussion of differences between “old” regulatory agencies such as the now-defunct Interstate Commerce 
Commission and “new” agencies such as the EPA. 
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further under the watchful eye of advocacy groups supporting or opposing the new legislation 
and hoping to influence its implementation.  
Because presidents didn’t have complete control over the agendas of executive agencies, 
since the 1970s they have sought to put the brakes on this regulatory process by requiring a 
review by economists of the costs, benefits, and effects of all regulations. The key event was 
Executive Order 12291, issued on February 17, 1981, shortly after President Reagan took office, 
announcing new rules governing the issuance of regulations by federal agencies. E.O. 12291 
introduced two revolutionary innovations into federal rulemaking. First, it required federal 
agencies to produce, before any “major” proposed regulation could appear in the Federal 
Register,8 an assessment of the benefits and costs of the proposal and alternatives to it. Before 
the Reagan administration, economic assessment of regulations was concerned not with benefits 
and costs, but with “economic impacts,” which included the effect of the regulation on the 
inflation, employment, and the profits of affected industries.9 In addition, E.O. 12291 required 
centralized review of regulations and the accompanying RIA by an oversight group, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), housed in the Office of Management and Budget.  
The regulatory review process in the United States is now governed by E.O. 12866, issued by 
Bill Clinton on September 30, 1993.10 The main changes to the Reagan procedure were to 
increase the public’s accessibility to the process, to add requirements to examine distributional 
consequences of rules, and to require only that the benefits of proposed regulations have to 
“justify” the costs, not “outweigh” the costs as it had been in E.O. 12291. Presumably, this last 
change in particular would make it easier to proceed with the regulation even if measured 
benefits do not exceed measured costs. 
                                                 
8 “Major” regulations are those with an anticipated annual cost in excess of $100 million or those that may have 
adverse environmental or distributional consequences. 
9 See Magat et al. (1986) for a discussion of the preparation and use of such studies in the Effluent Guidelines 
rulemaking process. 
10 President Bush made some minor procedural amendments in E.O. 13258, but the major elements were 
unchanged. 
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For the most part, however, Clinton retained and streamlined the procedures put in place by 
Reagan. In other words, recent presidents of both parties support the regulatory review 
requirements, including the RIA. It has ceased to be the partisan political issue it once was.  
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